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We live in the Information Age. We can peer into our neighbors'
backyards through satellite imaging, catch the latest Australian cricket scores
on our smart phones, track our loved ones' airline flights online, and
correspond with people virtually anywhere on earth via e-mail. In the era of
globalization, we have greater access to stock quotes, scientific reports,
medical advice, celebrity gossip, and breaking events than ever before, and
we can get this information by the terabyte. The importance placed on
information, of course, is nothing new: access to information has long been
the lifeblood of any highly complicated endeavor, whether commanding a
battalion in wartime or constructing an aqueduct, and dissemination of
information has been critical to organized society as long as humans have
lived in groups. Today, however, information flows through our lives with a
velocity.and a pervasiveness never before experienced.
Despite this ubiquity of information, no one has proposed calling the
present era the Knowledge Age. In fact, some would contend that the very
pace and force with which information flows through our daily lives has
outstripped our cognitive ability to comprehend and evaluate information in
sensible ways. Knowledge depends not only on access to reliable
information, but also on sound judgment regarding which information to
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access and how to situate that information in relation to the values and
purposes that comprise the individual's or the social group's larger projects.
This is certainly the case for wise and effective governance. A regulator
does need accurate information to understand the nature of a problem and the
consequences of potential responses. Likewise, the regulated community
needs information to decide how best to comply with adopted rules, and the
public needs information in order to accept the credibility and legitimacy of
the regulatory regime. This is as true for antitrust policy and consumer-
products safety as for military-base closings and controlling steroid use in
professional sports.
But governance also requires judgment regarding how to manage
information itself-how to structure burdens of proof in light of goals such
as public safety or promotion of economic growth, how to balance the
public's interest in disclosure against competing aims such as national
security or the protection of trade secrets, whether to withhold information in
the belief that it may actually be harmful to the recipient, and so on. These
challenges of information management are posed with especial starkness in
the context of environmental law. At its core, the field is concerned with the
impacts of human activities on the natural environment and human health
and safety; as such, theoretical and empirical uncertainty is an inescapable
part of the environmental-law equation. Indeed, the scientific method-from
which all environmental policy making must draw in one way or another-is
built on the notion that knowledge is never complete. What we take to be
scientific orthodoxy is better viewed as a set of contingent truth claims whose
veracity always can be called into doubt by new investigations, experiments,
and hypotheses.
Yet regulators cannot display the epistemological patience of the
scientific method; they must make decisions today. Whether with respect to
the impact of greenhouse-gas emissions on climate stability, synthetic
chemicals on the human endocrine system, or planned developments on critical
wetland habitat, information and understanding in the environmental arena
arrive too late, if ever, to design "optimal" legal and policy responses.
Moreover, most environmental problems involve not only highly complex and
uncertain scientific matters, but also technical and economic ones. On such
matters, decision makers rarely have anything approaching complete
knowledge when asked to put in place rules and regulations. To many
observers, this inherent need to make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty-whether the decisions regard scientific, economic, or
technological matters-is the defining feature of environmental law.1
The articles in this Symposium Issue were written in response to the
topic "Harnessing the Power of Information for the Next Generation of
1. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 19-21 (2004)
(noting ways in which scientific uncertainty is endemic to environmental law).
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Environmental Law." The pieces range across an impressive breadth of
topics, from litigation under the Freedom of Information Act and scientific
integrity under the Endangered Species Act to climate-change modeling and
monitoring of fugitive air emissions; they examine a wide array of decision
makers, from the Environmental Protection Agency and other federal and
state agencies to nongovernmental organizations and private litigants. The
challenge for any symposium on such a broad topic, and particularly a topic
this foundational to its field, is to ensure that the sum is greater than the parts.
Put simply, how does this collection of articles teach us to think differently
and usefully about the many roles and challenges of information in
environmental protection? All of the following papers address various
aspects of environmental information, but how do they fit together?
The old fable about a group of blind men and an elephant, made popular
for Western audiences by John Godfrey Saxe's poem, describes the challenge
well. The story goes that the blind men fall into an argument while
examining an animal. Feeling the elephant's "squirming trunk," one reports
that the animal "is very like a snake!" Another, touching the elephant's
"strong and sturdy side," states that it "is very like a wall!" After all the men
in the group have reported their findings in this manner, the poet provides the
following lesson:
And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!
2
The role of information in environmental law is sufficiently elephantine
that this fable may be instructive. Undoubtedly, academic research must
focus on particular areas and applications in order to glean new insights
regarding environmental information. Only through such detailed, careful
analysis can we be sure that our more abstract, generalized understanding of
information's role in environmental law and policy will remain an astute one.
But it is also essential to pull the lens back periodically to a macro scale,
allowing our detailed assessments and case studies to be fit within a coherent
whole.
Without wishing to imply that our vision somehow encompasses the
whole elephant or that the articles in this Issue are "in the wrong," we
provide in this Introduction a macro-scale schematic within which to
consider this Symposium Issue. While any model is necessarily-indeed
intentionally-incomplete, the model below (Figure 1) provides a framework
from which to understand the connections among the articles in this Issue.
The model sets out three distinct-though related-processes or stages
2. JOHN GODFREY SAXE, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN
GODFREY SAXE 11, 112 (Houghton Mifflin 1882).
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through which information flows in environmental protection: collection and
construction; use and abuse; and access and dissemination. These processes
can be seen, from a straightforward perspective, as efforts by government
regulators to acquire, utilize, and share the information requisite to
environmental decision making. From another perspective, the processes can
be seen as structuring a balance of power and responsibility within various
relationships, whether between market actors and regulators, government and
citizens, or market actors and citizens. In this sense, the model reflects the
fact that the articles in this Symposium Issue, unlike other recent and
important contributions, 3 are mainly concerned with the institutions and
arenas that shape, contest, and deploy information, rather than with the
various technological advances that are expected to enable better monitoring
and more precise predictions in the environmental policy-making arena (e.g.,
bioassays, Web-based monitoring, "smart dust," and genetic algorithms).
Figure 1: Information Processes in Environmental Protection
Collection & Use & Access &
Construction Abuse Dissemination
I. Collection and Construction
Decision makers need a wealth of information about the present and
predicted state of the environment and its inhabitants in order to effectively
shape policy. Is the climate changing? How does this affect polar bear
3. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 115, 156-74 (2004) (describing advances in data collection, analysis, and dissemination).
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habitats? How will it affect habitats in the future? Are emissions of benzene
causing significant harms? If so, where and for which populations are the
harms most serious? Assuming that the answers to such questions suggest
the need for regulation, decision makers further require vast amounts of
information regarding the anticipated effects of competing policy options.
Will requiring a given pollution-control technology bankrupt the relevant
industry? How would consumers respond to mandatory supermarket
warnings regarding the mercury content of fish? Would a tax on greenhouse-
gas emissions curb energy use? By how much?
In one sense, these various needs for scientific, economic, and technical
information simply require decision makers to collect relevant information
from relevant information-holders. Permit requirements in pollution law, for
instance, enable agencies to obtain pertinent data on emissions from industry
in a simple and-due to the monetary fines imposed if data are not submitted
or are falsified 4-largely effective way. Pre-market approval requirements
for prescription drugs and, to a lesser degree, pesticides, function similarly to
"pull" information on anticipated health effects from firms as they attempt to
market new products. With somewhat less stringency and effectiveness (as
indicated by the thickness of the arrows on the left side of Figure 1), laws
such as those establishing the Toxic Release Inventory require polluters to
provide data on their annual releases of certain compounds above a threshold
amount.
5
Even from this relatively straightforward perspective, complicated
questions arise. As John Applegate's treatment of chemical information as a
problem of supply and demand helps us to see, information from both public
and private providers can be thought of in market terms; accordingly, we also
can consider how such information markets must be regulated to ensure the
quality and volume of outputs. 6 Writing from a similar vantage point, Brad
Karkkainen offers additional accounts of how regulation can be structured to
satisfy informational demands through careful use of incentives, "penalty
defaults," and other sophisticated design features.7 As both authors make
clear, a key argument in favor of precautionary approaches long has been that
shifting the burden of proof in the environmental-law context off of public
regulators and onto private actors works to counterbalance certain perceived
structural asymmetries of the unregulated market. Rather than requiring
agencies affirmatively to demonstrate key informational aspects of an
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2000) (detailing the federal enforcement provisions of the Clean
Air Act).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (2000).
6. John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for Chemical
Information, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1365 (2008).
7. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1409 (2008).
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environmental policy problem, precautionary approaches instead actively
deploy private actors in service of the public's informational needs.
Nevertheless, in many regulatory contexts, agencies must depend on
their own modeling or experimentation, on existing academic work, or on
entirely new work that the agencies sponsor or support as sources of needed
information, rather than leverage legal authority to require private actors to
generate that information for them. Such agency information-generation
efforts recently have come under significant scrutiny, with proponents of
regulatory-reform initiatives, such as the Data Quality Act and the Office of
Management and Budget's agency-peer-review guidelines, contending that
the scientific and informational practices of agencies need to be disciplined
in order to ensure that they reflect "sound science." 8 Critics contend that
such initiatives are less concerned with ensuring the collection of reliable
information than with burdening agencies in order to limit their ability to
regulate industry. 9 They raise the more general concern that agencies cannot
always be required to comprehensively "fill" information gaps in
environmental law, because such a demand in practice would be so costly or
administratively burdensome as to amount to a deregulatory mandate.
Instead, critics contend that agencies should be given tools with which to
"bridge" information gaps (to use Applegate's felicitous term), allowing the
burden of uncertainty to fall on regulated industries rather than on the public
and the environment.
Conflict over regulatory-reform initiatives demonstrates that the process
of collecting information for policy purposes also can be seen as a more
active and strategic process of constructing which categories and sources of
information are deemed relevant and reliable within environmental policy
making. For instance, on one level, Tom McGarity's account of efforts by a
state environmental agency's mobile-monitoring team to better assess air-
pollutant emissions from large industrial facilities is a tale about the growing
use and acceptance of a new environmental-monitoring technology.' 0 By
focusing on stationary rather than mobile sampling, traditional monitoring
approaches gather information only from the "trunk" of a factory-its
smokestacks-missing entirely the factory's "fugitive emissions." On
another level, however, McGarity's account is a tale about how the mobile-
monitoring team managed to navigate a relatively unfriendly legal and
political context-both inside and outside of the agency-in order to
8. See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing peer review as a principal demand of the "sound science" agenda).
9. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science " Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over
the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 2003, at 63, 87-109 (mentioning several of the likely negative results from such initiatives,
including the reduction of the number and quality of studies, the chilling of scientific innovation,
and prohibitive costs and burdens).
10. Thomas 0. McGarity, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Migrating Hot Spots, and the Prospect of
Data-Driven Regulation of Complex Industrial Complexes, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1445 (2008).
[Vol. 86:13471352
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establish mobile-monitoring data as a relevant and potentially decisive factor
in regulatory outcomes.
This perspective is even more evident in Christine Overdevest and Brian
Mayer's fascinating account of community-led "bucket brigades."'" Armed
with relatively inexpensive air-quality-monitoring technologies, members of
bucket brigades informally gathered sampling data on emissions from local
plants in order to focus the attention of firms, regulators, and the public on
pollution hot spots. Lacking the level of authority held by government
agencies, bucket brigades can be seen instead as "information entrepreneurs,"
developing new information and injecting it into the policy process with
hopes of altering existing equilibria regarding what counts as a demonstrated
environmental harm. Mary Jane Angelo's article similarly depicts academics
as information entrepreneurs, developing particular methodologies and
theoretical frameworks that compete for acceptance not only in the academic
realm, but also in the policy-making arena. 2 Angelo examines various
extrascientific factors driving the selection and use of scientific approaches
by government agencies, considering especially why the field of
"emergetics" has never been broadly adopted by regulators.
These various examples suggest that environmental law must concern
itself intimately with the processes by which information for regulatory
decision making is developed. This concern must encompass questions
about how accurate and reliable ensuing information is likely to be and how
inclusive, transparent, and legitimate the processes of information collection
are. Relevant questions raised by the articles along these lines include:
* Should there be a greater reliance on information-gathering by
civil society? If so, who should be the primary audiences for this
information: government, local communities, environmental
groups, or others? What incentives can be crafted to increase the
collection of information by nonstate actors?
" Under what circumstances, if any, should government agencies
use civil-society-generated information as the basis for
enforcement actions? Apart from reliability concerns, what are
the dangers in democratizing the development of knowledge?
• To what extent is the community-monitoring model
generalizable? Could we imagine water-quality tests being
conducted by citizens groups to buttress total maximum daily
loads? Could we use Google Earth 5.0 to make sure that
landowners are not violating their habitat conservation plans?
11. Christine Overdevest & Brian Mayer, Harnessing the Power of Information Through
Community Monitoring: Insights from Social Science, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1493 (2008).
12. Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of Science in Environmental Law: Why We
Should, Why We Don't, and How We Can, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1527 (2008).
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" To what extent do we find the outsourcing of scientific research
and data collection to citizens' groups less troubling than the
outsourcing to industry and other for-profit entities? If we do
feel less troubled, how do we justify that reaction?
* More information is presumably a good thing, but how should
one balance the marginal costs of collecting more or different
types of information with the added benefits? Are "bridging"
approaches to regulation-which, as described by Applegate,
circumvent Herculean information challenges by establishing
standards or targets in an alternative, more achievable fashion-
preferable to approaches that aim for comprehensive
information?
* Does the traditional precautionary "tilt" of environmental law, as
manifested in burden-shifting statutes and similar proposals,
ignore the fact that risks exist on both -sides of the regulatory
equation, as critics have charged? Is it responsive to
asymmetries of power and information, rather than merely to
asymmetries of environmental, health, or safety concerns?
* Are agencies better modeled as inherently self-aggrandizing
bureaucracies, as implicitly suggested by many proponents of
peer-review requirements and other regulatory reforms, or as
sincerely motivated but overburdened promoters of the public
interest, as suggested by critics of such measures?
II. Use and Abuse
Distinguishing between the collection of information and its use in
policy formation and implementation is not always a clear-cut exercise. The
types of information sought, and the manner in which it is gathered, can be
affected heavily by the perceived uses to which it will be put. Conversely,
the anticipated use for which information is collected may need to be
reformulated once the content of that information has been revealed. The
National Environmental Policy Act of 196913 (NEPA), especially as
interpreted by the courts to impose only procedural requirements, seems to
have been premised on this notion of reciprocal influence between
information collection and use.14  Merely by forcing the compilation of
environmental-impact information and prompting its consideration in some
unspecified but nontrivial way, NEPA was supposed to transform
government decision making.
13. 42 U.S.C, §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
14. See generally J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 433
(2008) (noting that NEPA's reliance on simple information generation and gathering reflects a
"belief that government will do the right thing if it has all of the relevant information before it").
[Vol. 86:13471354
HeinOnline  -- 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1354 2007-2008
Foreword: Making Sense of Information
As Karkkainen notes, this promise has been imperfectly realized in the
NEPA context: more information alone, without clear directives as to how
agencies should use that information, seems to be insufficient to ensure
environmentally sustainable decision making. For these reasons, Alyson
Flournoy offers a legislative proposal for a National Environmental Legacy
Act-a sort of NEPA on steroids-in which society would be required to (a)
define the legacy we wish to leave future generations; (b) undertake
systematic investigation of how proposed actions would affect our resource
legacy; (c) proscribe inconsistent actions; and (d) utilize ongoing monitoring
to ensure that we are on the desired path.1 5 Unlike NEPA, Flournoy's Act
would have substantive bite: it would, for instance, place the burden of proof
on opponents of government regulation to demonstrate that new technologies
or substitute resources will be available should a threatened natural resource
be lost.
As Flournoy's example demonstrates, a critical question concerning the
role of information in environmental policy making is how to address its
nonavailability. As noted above, several contributors analyze different ways
in which burdens of proof within environmental law and policy can be
manipulated in order to help generate more complete information regarding
environmental, health, and safety threats. Even with careful management of
the information-producing potential of regulation, decision makers still will
often find themselves in the position of needing to adopt rules or prescribe
standards with nowhere near the level of information that they would ideally
hold for the task. Moreover, even the information that decision makers do
have will be subject to political interference and abuse. The article by Holly
Doremus, for example, recounts numerous recent examples where scientific
integrity has been compromised for political expediency., 6 Such potential
for abuse again underscores the significance of process: absent transparency
concerning how decisions are being made about information and uncertainty
(e.g., clear specification of assumptions, disclosure of confidence intervals,
and undertaking of robustness analysis), there can be a great deal of
skepticism over the role that politics played in decisions masked by the
veneer of science.
Dan Farber addresses this challenge head-on in the heavily politicized
context of climate change.17 Because of its "wicked" features, the climate-
change problem is forcing careful thinking about the problem of regulating in
the face of radical uncertainty concerning potentially significant, even
catastrophic, harms. In fact, our awareness of the degree of uncertainty
15. Alyson C. Flournoy et al., Harnessing the Power of Information to Protect Our Public
Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1575 (2008).
16. Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEXAS L.
REV. 1601 (2008).
17. Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86
TEXAS L. REV. 1655 (2008).
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characterizing climate change often has paradoxically increased as our
understanding of the phenomenon deepens. Thus, unlike regulatory cost-
benefit analysis, which is premised on the notion that regulators can generate
more-or-less comprehensive numerical estimates of the effects of policies,
climate-change policy making must reflect an awareness that probabilistic
sophistication cannot always be obtained in advance of the moment that
policies must be adopted.
This is not to say that economic cost-benefit models cannot be
constructed for the climate-change situation; in fact, in addition to his
valuable "user's guide" to climate-impact models, Farber also provides an
overview of such ambitious integrated-assessment models. He finds,
however, that the economic models at this juncture are less sophisticated than
the physical models because the economic models are riddled with subjective
assumptions, ad hoc exclusions, and other highly debatable techniques for
"taming" climate change's radical uncertainty. For that reason, alternative
policy approaches to cost-benefit optimization-such as scenario-based
planning or the adoption of safe minimum standards-may be commendable
simply because they have a greater degree of transparency regarding how
they handle the unavoidable uncertainties of climate policy. As David
Adelman noted in a presentation at this Symposium, scenario-based
approaches in particular offer a high degree of accessibility to the public,
especially when tailored to a geographic focus-such as the American
Southwest-that can resonate strongly with readers. These examples again
illustrate the fact that the generation of information and understanding in the
environmental-law context must be attentive to a broader range of concerns
than would a purely academic exercise-including the need to engender
public awareness of environmental threats and to avoid unduly technical or
otherwise inaccessible renderings of environmental information.
In addition to democratic sensitivity, effective environmental policy
making also requires the possibility of flexible, adaptive rulemaking-a
demand that may well be in tension with the former need.18 Because policies
typically must be established on the basis of highly incomplete and imperfect
information, and because the underlying natural, economic, and social
systems are themselves highly complex and adaptive, regulators must remain
on the lookout for new information, changes to ecosystems, technological
breakthroughs, and other factors that might significantly alter regulatory
equilibriums. In their contribution, Lynn Blais and Wendy Wagner consider
how changes in information and, particularly, the availability and cost of
pollution-control technology should be integrated into the rulemaking
18. See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 31 (2005) (noting that agencies have not been able to use adaptive management because
legislatures have not empowered them to-and interest groups have not let them--do so).
1356 [Vol. 86:1347
HeinOnline  -- 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1356 2007-2008
Foreword: Making Sense of Information
process.' 9 They note that, despite the promise of technology-based standards
to force deployment and even the development of cutting-edge pollution-
control technologies, in fact agencies rarely if ever update such standards,
even decades after they are passed. This "aging" of technology-based
standards strongly suggests they are not adequately responsive to changing
circumstances. It is hard to believe that decades-old technologies still reflect
the "best" available control methods. In light of this problem, Blais and
Wagner propose "contemporaneous revision planning" as a way for agencies
to precommit to later review and revision of major rules.
Blais and Wagner's proposal may be thought of as a form of "meta-
regulation," the term used by Overdevest and Mayer to capture the increasing
role of agencies as managers or overseers of subregulatory processes, such as
information-gathering by civil-society organizations or scientific
experimentation by private contractors. From the meta-regulation
perspective, agencies must become more self-reflective and deliberate in the
way they manage their information needs and rulemaking activities. Blais
and Wagner's proposal for contemporaneous revision planning embodies
such critical self-attention by acknowledging imperfection up front and by
tying the agency's hands in a way that ensures future reevaluation. From a
somewhat similar vantage point, Sidney Shapiro and Rena Steinzor examine
the Government Performance and Results Act, a statute that seeks to increase
accountability by requiring agencies to establish strategic plans that then
form a basis for review of agency performance.2a Shapiro and Steinzor
contend that this effort at institutionalizing performance review for agencies
has failed in practice, generating a great deal of self-serving paperwork but
little actual accountability. They propose a variety of changes that would
better align the statute's requirements with the overarching goal of enabling
agencies to effectuate the public interest.
As with the articles concerning the collection and construction of
information, these contributions raise a number of further questions for
research and consideration:
* What alternative decision-making approaches-such as the
precautionary principle, the safe-minimum-standards approach,
the minimax criterion, or scenario-based decision making-are
best equipped to grapple with the policy stakes and the level of
uncertainty at issue in a case like climate change?
* Are universities now viewed as just another interest group?
What hopes are there for the new transdisciplinary field of law-
science that Angelo posits in her contribution? What, if
19. Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1701 (2008).
20. Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86
TEXAS L. REV. 1741 (2008).
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anything, can universities do to stop or to slow the demise of
scientific integrity in policy making that Doremus observes?
0 From a historical vantage point, have we made significant
progress in our efforts to harness information for environmental
protection? Is the government using environmental information
better or more effectively than ten or twenty years ago? Is the
government abusing environmental information more now than
in the past?
III. Access and Dissemination
Apart from the issue of how agencies collect relevant information for
regulatory decision making is the issue of how nongovernmental entities,
such as civil-society representatives, the media, or victims of environmental
harm, gain access to information. Much of the work of information
dissemination is, again, performed by governmental entities. Having
gathered, digested, and in some sense used information relating to an
environmental policy issue, regulators then face the questions of whether and
how to communicate results outside of the government. Obviously,
regulated industries themselves will be a primary target of government
communications because those industries must have relevant information to
guide their conduct and, relatedly, have a legitimate claim to see and evaluate
the informational basis on which regulations were premised. But regulators
also often package information for broader public consumption, as evidenced
by the EPA's Envirofacts Data Warehouse Web site2' and the joint online
effort of the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to
release pertinent information on occupational chemicals.22 In many contexts,
the provision of such information is believed to be a low-cost, nonintrusive
way of regulating markets such that they better replicate the competitive-
market ideal.
Perhaps not surprisingly, dissemination of information by agencies also
generates efforts by private actors to reframe the underlying information in
some fashion relevant to the actors' goals. This has been particularly true as
the expansion of the Internet and improvement of computing-platform
interoperability have made the task of capturing and manipulating data much
easier. For instance, Scorecard.org, a Web site managed by the
environmental organization Green Media Toolshed, utilizes information
disclosed through the Toxics Release Inventory and other government
databases to generate publicly accessible, user-friendly environmental
information. The Scorecard Web site allows users to type in their postal
21. EPA, Envirofacts Data Warehouse, http://www.epa.gov/enviro (last updated Feb. 21, 2008).
22. OSHA, OSHA/EPA Occupational Chemical Database, http://www.osha.gov/web/dep/
chemicaldata.
23. Scorecard: The Pollution Information Site, http://scorecard.org.
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code and assess the major environmental harms in their community's
backyard. The fact that raw statistical data can be repackaged in such a
powerful and empowering way reveals the incompleteness of the simple
informational regulation account: information provision never merely serves
to correct a narrowly delineated and self-contained market failure; it also
works, at least in part, to redefine the market in which it intervenes.
In light of the potential for civil society to scrutinize and reuse (and
perhaps distort) government information in this manner, it is not surprising
that public officials and agencies often have mixed feelings about releasing
information concerning the hazards they have discovered or the regulations
they have chosen to address those hazards. Nevertheless, just as the
government's collection of information about impacts on the natural world
serves a vital function in ensuring the effectiveness of its regulatory efforts,
the public's collection of information about the government serves the
function of ensuring the legitimacy, credibility, and, ultimately, the
effectiveness of the regulatory regime. Encapsulated in the powerful phrase
"the public's right to know," and embodied in statutes such as the Freedom
of Information Act 24 (FOIA) or treaties such as the Aarhus Convention, 25 a
right of access to government information is considered to be an essential
prong of good governance.
David Vladeck's article details the development of FOIA in the United
States and the roadblocks that have increasingly obstructed public access to
government information.26 Whether these obstacles are justified by the
security concerns raised by the War on Terror or the need to protect
confidential business information-two key arguments offered in opposition
to disclosure-remains the subject of considerable debate, but any benefits
from restricting the flow of information to the public must surely be weighed
against the costs of government in the shadows. Indeed, it is worth recalling
that environmental information in the former Soviet Union was regarded as a
state secret, and its disclosure was a criminal offense.27
As Vladeck's article discusses the use of FOIA to extract information
from government officials, Timothy Lytton's article addresses the use of civil
litigation by private actors to force disclosure of information regarding harms
that, however real, are not being acknowledged by established channels of
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
25. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447.
26. David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal
Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1787 (2008).
27. See, e g., Phil Reeves, Nuclear Whistle-Blower Goes on Trial, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 20,
1998, at 15 (describing the trial of Alexander Nikitin, a Russian naval officer arrested and charged
with treason for revealing details of Russia's handling of radioactive materials from its Northern
submarine fleet).
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authority and influence.28 Although ultimately such litigation may aim to
accomplish direct changes in harmful behavior-hence its common
characterization as "regulation through litigation"--it also serves the more
immediate purpose of simply shining a light on wrongs, such as clergy sexual
abuse or black-market handgun sales, that are not being addressed within the
current regulatory context. As with the use of FOIA, such actions are
premised on Justice Brandeis's familiar notion that "[s]unlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants. 29
Both Vladeck's account of FOIA litigation and Lytton's depiction of the
use of the tort system to pry information from its unwilling holders reflect an
adversarial, competitive model of interaction. Although somewhat
paradigmatic of the American legal system, this model is not exclusive.
Many domestic efforts to reform regulation have sought a more cooperative,
flexible dynamic, and new models of governance on the international level
frequently emphasize the need for collaborative responsibility-sharing among
stakeholders, with the government serving a more limited role of managerial
oversight than traditionally conceived-again, recalling Overdevest and
Mayer's notion of meta-regulation. Although much scholarly attention, both
supportive and critical, has been devoted to these reformulated depictions of
regulation, the particular role of information in the collaborative-governance
context has perhaps been understudied. Again, further questions arise, both
with respect to the notion of meta-regulation and to the issue of information
access and dissemination more generally:
* What strategies for information dissemination are most likely to
engage the public in environmental protection, especially in
light of new technologies and capabilities for involvement?
Can Web-based participatory programs serve not only to gather
valuable information, but also to promote environmental
citizenship?
* Is there a significant potential danger that disseminators of
information will misinform and distort the debate, as some
charge has been occurring in the climate-change debate? Does
the potential for information to be misleading justify its
restriction, as has been proposed in the case of some
controversial food technologies such as genetically modified
agriculture?
30
28. Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Policymaking: Evaluating Climate-
Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86
TEXAS L. REv. 1837 (2008).
29. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62
(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper Torchbooks 1967) (1914).
30. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REv. 526, 561-62 (2004) (mentioning that the
FDA's justification for not requiring labeling of genetically modified foods is that the labels might
be incorrect or misleading).
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* How would our conceptual toolbox change if we think of
agencies as managers of subregulatory processes rather than as
direct regulators? What is the complementary set of instru-
ments to standards, prices, and permits if the agency conceives
of itself as a meta-regulator rather than a direct regulator? How
should judicial review change? What personnel and resource
needs do agencies have in this reformulated vision of the
agency mission?
IV. Conclusion
As noted at the outset, our attempt to provide a big-picture model of the
role of information in environmental law is necessarily incomplete. Indeed,
our picture of the elephant could be paired with numerous other attempts to
capture the elephant only to reveal yet another, even larger and more
mysterious, creature. To thoroughly mangle our metaphors, we might even
suggest that any attempt to fully model information in environmental
protection is necessarily incomplete, for it is elephants all the way down.
By way of illustration, Figure 2 reproduces a model developed by Philip
Morris to show how the company seeks to influence legislative decisions.
The model formed part of an internal Philip Morris corporate-affairs
document from 1993 that was eventually released during tort litigation
against the company.3' Its contrast with our model is striking. Its focus is on
"ideology and beliefs," "special constituents," and "media," all of which it
sees as "tools" to affect government decisions. Philip Morris's
understanding of how to influence legislators surely is sophisticated and
warrants serious attention if we really want to understand the different forces
at work in translating information into government action. Two differences
with our model stand out.
While our information model represents government decision makers as
the operative forces determining regulatory outcomes, subject to various
attempted interventions and influences by other actors, the Philip Morris
diagram depicts the company itself as the primary determinant of
government action. It obviously believes it can create and shape the relevant
information flow.
Moreover, while not explicitly identified in our diagram, a naturalistic
assumption underlies its construction: the environment is taken to be a source
of potentially objective empirical information that merely needs to be
transmitted by reliable scientists and other observers to government decision
makers. This would seem a strange world, indeed, compared to that modeled
by Philip Morris. Here, information directed to the decision maker is
actively manufactured and framed by media, allied interest groups, and other
3 1. The complete document in high-quality viewing format is available at http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/td/trm65eOO.
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influential shapers of perception. There appears to be no solid
epistemological ground in which to anchor oneself: even science itself is
depicted as just another location for active political intervention and
manipulation. The reference to "TASSC" in Figure 2, for instance, refers to
a lobbying effort of commercial and industrial firms that Philip Morris
organized under the sobriquet "The Advancement of Sound Science
Coalition." This organization played a significant role in turning the political
climate against conventional precautionary approaches to environmental,
health, and safety regulation, in substantial part by re-signifying industry-
supported policy approaches as uniquely associated with "sound science.
'
,
32
Although ultimately the tobacco companies' fortunes declined in the
face of litigation by progressive state attorneys general in the 1990s, the point
of the Philip Morris model remains relevant in many respects, for the
successful efforts of the tobacco industry to perpetuate controversy over
scientific and medical information has been a model public-relations strategy
for other high-stakes policy disputes. Thus, by failing to include within our
model the role of interest groups (both corporate and environmental) in
influencing regulatory policy-and indeed in shaping the understanding of
what constitutes "sound science," "data quality," and other such seemingly
positivistic notions associated with the use of information in policy
making-we may well have captured only a trunk or a tail, leaving much of
the elephant before us still to view.
32. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species
Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 398, 399 n.2 (2004) (describing the origins and role of TASSC).
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Figure 2: Phillip Morris Model for Influencing Legislative Decisions
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